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Florida,	Cuba	And	
The	Spanish–American	War:
The	Intelligence	Game
by	Joe	Knetsch,	Ph.D.
	 In	 1898	 officers	 headed	 to	 the	 newly	 erupting	 conflict	 between	 the	
United	 States	 and	 Spain	 in	 Cuba	 were	 handed	 a	 valuable	 piece	 of	 information.	
Entitled	 “Military	 Notes	 on	 Cuba”	 and	 issued	 by	 the	 Adjutant	 General’s	 Office,	
Military	 Information	 Division	 (MID),	 this	 document	 provided	 the	 young	
commanding	 officers	 with	 valuable	 data	 on	 nearly	 every	 important	 city,	 railroad,	
harbor,	etc.	on	 that	 long-suffering	 island.	 	The	 intelligence	gathered	 to	create	 this	
useful	and	carefully	documented	volume	came	from	our	military	attache’s,	the	Spanish	
archives	 (and	 those	 of	 other	 countries),	 consular	 reports,	 travelers	 and	 numerous	
unnamed	“insurrectionists”	both	in	and	outside	of	Cuba,	many	living	in	Tampa.		Its	
compilation	began	with	 the	efforts	of	Captain	 (later	Brigadier	General)	George	P.	
Scriven	of	the	Army	Signal	Corps	in	1892,	a	full	three	years	before	the	outbreak	of	
the	revolution	of	1895.		Scriven	not	only	gave	a	picture	of	the	physical	characteristics	
but	 also	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 Cuban	 railway	 system,	 Cuba’s	 topography	 and	 it	
contained	a	general	discussion	of	the	military	situation	on	the	island.		Some	personal	
reconnaissance	was	also	included	in	the	volume	but	its	most	important	components	
came	 from	 Cubans.	 	 As	 Colonel	 Bruce	W.	 Bidwell	 has	 explained	 in	 his	 “History	
of	the	Military	Intelligence	Division,	Department	of	the	Army	General	Staff,”	(the	
unpublished	version),	“In	addition	to	this	source,	a	well-organized	Cuban	Nationalist	
Junta	had	been	functioning	in	New	York	City	ever	since	1868.		Having	engineered	
the	still	smouldering	revolt	against	Spanish	rule	which	opened	in	1895,	its	members	
remained	perfectly	willing	at	all	times	to	furnish	the	War	Department	with	desired	
Joe	Knetsch	holds	a	Ph.D.	in	history	from	Florida	State	University.		Knetsch,	a	Government	Analyst	II	
within	Florida’s	Bureau	of	Survey	and	Mapping,	Division	of	State	Lands,	has	authored	numerous	articles	
on	Florida	topics,	with	an	emphasis	on	Florida’s	pioneer	era	and	military	history.
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information	 about	 the	 Caribbean	 area.	 	 When	 supplemented	 by	 a	 considerable	
amount	of	further	research	along	similar	lines,	these	two	main	sources	enabled	the	
Military	Information	Division,	AGO,	in	June	1898,	to	publish	a	very	comprehensive	
pamphlet	entitled	“Military	Notes	on	Cuba	…”		This	book	was	placed	“at	the	disposal	
of	every	officer”	of	the	Army	headed	to	that	troubled	land.1
	 The	 gathering	 of	 military	 intelligence	 by	 the	 U.	 S.	 Army	 in	 an	 organized,	
bureaucratic	sense	did	not	begin	until	Adjutant	General	R.	C.	Drum,	on	his	own	
initiative,	established	the	Military	Intelligence	Division	in	the	fall	of	1885.		This	was	
three	years	after	the	U.	S.	Navy	had	created	its	own	intelligence	agency,	the	Office	of	
Naval	Intelligence	(ONI).		Like	the	Navy	the	Army	was	very	soon	attaching	Military	
Attaches	to	our	foreign	legations	throughout	most	of	Europe	and	the	major	capitals	
in	Latin	America	and	Asia.		Drum	created	the	MID	from	the	Reservations	Division	
of	the	Miscellaneous	Branch	of	the	Office	of	the	Adjutant	General.		He	placed	the	
new	organization	under	the	command	of	Major	William	J.	Volkmar,	the	chief	of	the	
Miscellaneous	Branch.	 	The	assignment	of	 the	new	agency	was	to	gather	as	much	
information	as	it	“deemed	useful	and	beneficial	to	the	Army	at	large.”2		Maps	were	
gathered	in	great	quantities	from	all	available	sources	both	at	home	and	abroad	and	
checked	against	each	other	for	accuracy	and	other	fine	points	that	may	be	strategically	
useful.		Reports	from	the	newly	appointed	attaches	also	added	to	the	depth	of	the	
Division’s	knowledge	and	these	officers	were	required	to	search	newspapers,	reports,	
libraries,	archives	for	useful	data	and	to	question	travelers	about	things	they	witnessed	
or	saw	in	the	country	while	visiting.		The	Division’s	avid	collecting	demanded	that	
the	space	and	numbers	allotted	to	it	should	be	increased	which	soon	brought	it	to	the	
attention	of	the	head	of	the	Signal	Corps	who	felt	it	was	his	office’s	duty	to	collect	
this	data.		The	infighting	soon	became	very	bitter	and	counterproductive.3
	 Briefly	told	the	Signal	Corps	under	the	dynamic	leadership	of	Brigadier	General	
Adolphus	W.	Greely	was	certain	that	 it	had	been	assigned	the	duty	of	 intelligence	
gathering	and	was	not	willing	to	share	the	responsibility.		Greely	based	his	assumption	
on	an	act	of	Congress	passed	in	October	of	1890	stating	that	the	Signal	Corps	would	
“collect	information	for	the	Army	by	telegraph	and	otherwise.”		By	the	beginning	of	
1892	Greely	was	ready	to	put	up	a	full	fight	for	this	duty.		Unfortunately	for	him,	
Drum	had	the	strong	support	of	Secretary	of	War,	Stephen	Elkins,	and	Lieutenant	
General	of	the	Army,	John	M.	Schofield	who	was	then	the	Commanding	General	
of	the	Army.		By	March	1892	the	War	Department	General	Orders	were	issued	that	
gave	 the	 task	 of	 gathering	 “military	 intelligence”	 to	 the	 MID.	 	 Not	 only	 was	 the	
Division	given	this	daunting	task	but	it	was	also	assigned	the	duties	of	making	and	
1	 	Bruce	W.	Bidwell.	“History	Of	The	Military	Intelligence	Division,	Department	Of	The	Army	General	
Staff.”	Office	Of	The	Chief	Of	Military	History,	Department	Of	The	Army,	“Historical	Manuscript	File	
–	Unclassified”	2-3.7	Aa.N	Pt.	1.	Washington	D.	C.,	1959-61.		Vii-1	Thru	Vii-3.
2	 	Bruce	W.	Bidwell.	History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 
1775-1941.	Frederick,	Maryland:	University	Publications	of	America,	1986.	54-55.
3	 	Ibid.,	55.
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issuing	all	military	maps,	books	and	 instructions	 for	use	by	 the	Army	and	militia	
officers	and	State	troops.		It	was	also	to	develop	and	prepare	plans	for	mobilization	
and	the	transportation	of	volunteer	units	and	State	troops	“and	for	the	concentration	
of	the	military	forces	of	the	United	States	at	the	various	strategic	points	on	or	near	
the	frontiers	of	the	country.”		In	other	words	the	MID	was	to	take	on	the	functions	
of	a	smaller	General	Staff,	which	the	United	States	had	not	yet	implemented.		Under	
the	leadership	of	Major	Arthur	L.	Wagner	the	Division	soon	began	organizing	for	
these	tasks	with	a	staff	of	eleven	officers	in	addition	to	forty	state	based	officers	and	
sixteen	military	attaches.			One	of	the	most	strategically	placed	attaches	was	Captain	
Tasker	Bliss	whose	reports	from	Madrid,	when	added	to	the	information	provided	
by	 the	 Junta	 and	 exiled	 Cubans	 in	 Florida,	 allowed	 the	 Army	 to	 compute,	 “with	
unusual	accuracy”	the	actual	strength	of	the	Spanish	Army	units	located	throughout	
Cuba.4		Wagner’s	men	also	cooperated	with	the	Secret	Service	in	identifying	Spanish	
4	 	Ibid.,	55-61.		Also	see	Rhodri	Jeffreys-Jones.	American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA.	New	
York:	The	Free	Press,	1977.	26-27. 
Members	of	Company	H,	157th	Indiana	Volunteer	Infantry,	are	seen	drilling	amongst	the	palmetto	and	
pine	near	Port	Tampa.		Though	making	up	almost	half	of	the	30,000	soldiers	encamped	in	and	around	
Tampa	before	the	war,	volunteer	troops	made	up	a	very	small	percentage	of	those	who	actually	participated	
in	the	Spanish-American	War.
University of South Florida Special Collections Department
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spies	attempting	to	infiltrate	American	units	headed	for	Cuba	in	Tampa	after	the	war	
began.5
	 The	Navy	also	was	just	beginning	its	intelligence	service	in	this	era	and	had	
actually	preceded	the	Army’s	organization	by	a	couple	of	years.		The	emphasis	here	
was	also	with	the	attaches	and	their	duties	overseas.		The	Office	of	Naval	Intelligence	
was	 created	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Navigation	 in	 1882.	 	 There	 had	 been	 a	
movement	within	the	naval	establishment	to	modernize	the	United	States	Navy	and	
a	wide	recognition	of	its	decline	since	the	Civil	War	in	comparison	to	other	navies.	
The	reformers	included	Admiral	Stephen	B.	Luce,	Captain	French	Chadwick,	W.	W.	
Kimball,	Charles	C.	Rogers	and	a	young	officer	just	then	entering	the	main	part	of	
his	career,	Alfred	T.	Mahan.		The	first	chief	of	the	office	was	Lieutenant	Theordorus	
Bailey	Myers	Mason,	a	widely	traveled	and	savvy	collector	of	data.		At	first,	Mason	
tried	 to	 work	 with	 the	 established	 Naval	 Institute	 but	 found	 that	 this	 was	 too	
cumbersome	and	the	participants	were	interested	in	the	mechanical	modernization	
but	not	intelligence	gathering	and	distribution.		Mason	worked	well	with	his	bureau	
chief,	Commodore	John	Grimes	Walker,	who	appreciated	his	subordinate’s	talents	and	
tenacity.		They	were	fortunate	in	having	William	H.	Chandler	as	the	new	Secretary	
of	 the	 Navy	 who	 supported	 most	 of	 their	 efforts.	 	 At	 the	 25	 July	 1882	 meeting	
between	Mason	and	Chandler	the	Secretary	outlined	a	plan	to	gather	intelligence,	
compile,	 record	 and	 correct	 information	 and	 he	 created	 fourteen	 categories	 into	
which	each	type	of	intelligence	would	be	placed	and	organized.		Following	a	period	
of	 political	 interference	with	 the	 intelligence	 gathering	by	Under	 Secretary	 of	 the	
Navy	James	Russell	Soley,	the	ONI	underwent	a	dramatic	change	for	the	better	with	
the	appointment	of	French	E.	Chadwick	as	the	new	chief	in	1892.		Budget	cuts	in	the	
election	year	of	1892	did	not	enhance	the	gather	of	intelligence	preparatory	to	the	war	
with	Spain.		The	attaché	staff	was	cut	and	the	collection	of	overseas	intelligence	fell	
as	a	result.		Chadwick	did	not	have	a	chance	to	reform	or	improve	the	product	since	
he	was	in	only	for	about	a	year		The	second	Cleveland	administration	did	not	have	its	
eyes	on	collecting	intelligence	since	it	opposed	the	Republican	expansionist	program	
and	was	forced	to	deal	with	the	Panic	of	1893-94,	domestic	violence,	labor	disputes	
and	inflation.		Luckily,	ONI	had	one	ally	in	the	new	administration,	Secretary	of	the	
Navy	Hilary	Herbert.		Herbert	allowed	observers	to	go	into	the	Sino-Japanese	War	
area	and	sent	intelligence	agents	to	observe	the	harbor	at	Rio	de	Janeiro	during	the	
Brazilian	rebellion	of	1893-94.		Herbert	allowed	ONI	to	dispatch	attaches	and	others	
throughout	Latin	America,	including	Venezuela	where	the	United	States	had	a	major	
disagreement	with	Great	Britain.	 	Despite	the	presence	of	a	report	that	Spain	had	
approached	Great	Britain	about	a	possible	anti-United	States	alliance,	the	ONI	did	
not	become	involved	in	the	immediate	planning	for	naval	operations	in	the	Atlantic,	
Caribbean	 or	 Asia.	 	 Not	 until	 Lieutenant	 Commander	 Richard	Wainwright	 took	
over	ONI	with	the	new	McKinley	administration	did	the	office	begin	to	gear	for	war.	
5	 	Jeffreys-Jones,	26.	
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Wainwright	shared	many	ideas	with	the	old	reformers	with	whom	he	had	graduated	
from	the	Naval	Academy	and	with	the	new	Under	Secretary	of	the	Navy,	Theodore	
Roosevelt.		In	agreement	with	Mahan,	Roosevelt,	Senator	Henry	Cabot	Lodge	and	
others,	Wainwright	shared	the	“large	picture”	concept.6	
	 Wainwright	 had	 to	 face	 the	 immediate	 task	 of	 getting	 vast	 amounts	 of	
information	ready	for	distribution.		Japanese	interest	in	Hawaii	had	been	brought	to	
the	fore	with	the	pressure	of	the	Hawaiian	Revolution,	the	large	Asiatic	population	
in	 the	 islands	 and	 the	 development	 of	 U.	 S.	 interests	 in	 the	 Asian	 market	 and	
expansion.	 	At	 the	 same	 time	 the	German	 fleet	 had	 increased	dramatically	 under	
the	skillful	guidance	of	Admiral	Von	Terpitz.		Disputes	with	Great	Britain	over	seals	
in	the	Pacific	Northwest,	Venezuela’s	boundary	and	other	little	problems	made	the	
increasingly	important	Anglo-Saxon	alliance	between	the	United	States	and	Britain	
unlikely	although	paraded	constantly	in	the	press	and	popular	magazines.
By	the	advent	of	the	McKinley	administration	the	situation	in	Cuba	was	
rapidly	heating	up.		The	war	had	begun	in	1895	and	was	dragging	on	with	neither	
side	the	apparent	winner.		The	limited	resources	of	Spain	were	being	rapidly	used	up	
as	was	 its	eligible	military-age	population.	 	With	the	beginnings	of	 the	revolution	
in	 the	 Philippines	 the	 end	 was	 clearly	 on	 the	 horizon.	 	 Getting	 information	 to	
answer	policy	questions	and	military	inquiries	meant	that	the	ONI	(and	the	other	
intelligence	agencies)	would	have	to	greatly	increase	their	presence.		At	the	same	time,	
the	Naval	War	College	was	organizing	and	planning	for	the	coming	war	by	producing	
numerous	scenarios	that	could	be	applied	given	certain	situations.		ONI	was	called	
upon	to	supplement	the	information	available	at	the	college	and	to	quietly	assist	in	
implementing	the	plans	should	war	come	about	in	the	near	future.		One	of	the	major	
problems	was	where	to	focus	the	attention.		In	response	to	some	alarming	reports	and	
Roosevelt’s	public	statements	more	attention	was	actually	paid	to	German	aims	than	
those	of	Spain.		Not	until	the	sinking	of	the	Maine	was	the	attention	entirely	drawn	
to	war	with	Spain.7
	 ONI	 relied	heavily	upon	 the	 reports	of	 attaches	during	 this	 crucial	period,	
especially	those	stationed	in	Europe.		From	Madrid	Lieutenant	Commander	George	
L.	Dyer	reported	in	1897	the	Spanish	rumors	of	war	against	the	United	States.		The	
Spaniards,	according	to	Dyer,	had	full	faith	in	their	squadrons	and	believed	that	if	
an	encounter	 should	take	place	 they	could	defeat	 the	U.	S.	Navy	and	destroy	our	
commerce.	 	Brash	 talk	 in	Spanish	 circles	 of	 attacking	 the	American	 coastline	was	
also	bandied	about	in	Madrid.		From	Germany	came	the	warnings	of	Albert	Niblack	
that	Spain	had	purchased	two	Italian	cruisers	more	heavily	armed	than	the	New York,	
thought	 to	be	 the	best	 in	 the	U.	S.	Navy.	 	Roosevelt	 required	ONI	 to	produce	 a	
number	of	papers	on	coaling	stations,	fire	power	of	opposing	vessels,	cruising	range	of	
6	 	Jeffery	M.	Dorwart.	The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency, 
1865-1918.	Annapolis:	Naval	Institute	Press,	1979.,	12-54.
7	 	Ibid.,	55-59.
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both	our	ships	and	those	of	Spain,	and	other	vital	intelligence	for	military	planning.	
With	the	small	staff	allotted	over	the	recent	years	and	the	many	areas	to	be	explored	
it	is	no	surprise	that	the	intelligence	system	was	not	up	to	the	standards	of	the	day	
and	both	the	Navy	and	Army	had	much	to	learn	in	a	very	short	time.8
	 Tensions	with	the	government	of	Spain	in	Cuba	were	adding	to	the	increased	
need	for	information.	 	Many	Cubans	had	migrated	to	the	United	States	primarily	
to	go	 into	business	 to	assist	 their	 families	and	friends	back	home.	 	Many	of	 these	
men	 and	 women	 brought	 back	 information	 concerning	 conditions	 in	 Cuba	 and	
the	 problems	 of	 the	 Spanish	 administration	 and	 army.	 	This	 led	 to	 the	 arrest	 of	
numerous	 individuals	 who	 held	 such	 citizenship	 and	 put	 the	 United	 States	 in	 an	
awkward	position	 relative	 to	 the	disposition	of	 their	 cases.	 	The	arrest	 in	1896	of	
Mark	(Marcos)	E.	Rodriguez,	Luis	Someillan	y	Azpeitia	and	Luis	Smoeillan	y	Vidal	
created	such	a	sensation	that	the	Senate	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs	investigated	
the	matter.		Rodriguez	was	taken	in	broad	daylight	while	boarding	the	Olivette,	of	the	
Plant	Steamship	Line,	for	a	return	trip	to	Tampa.		All	three	men	were	arrested	and	
Members	of	the	71st	New	York	Volunteers	wait	to	board	Cuba-bound	transports	at	Port	Tampa.		The	71st	
was	one	of	the	few	volunteer	units	to	fight	in	Cuba	during	the	Spanish–American	War.
University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department
8	 	Ibid.,	60-62.
        
6
Tampa Bay History, Vol. 21 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1/6
	 The	Intelligence	Game										61
charged	with	sedition	and	rebellion.		Senator	Wilkerson	Call	of	Florida	led	the	charge	
to	get	these	men	released	and	returned	to	their	families.		Just	what	information	these	
men	could	pass	on	is	in	question	but	the	Spanish	government	was	sure	that	they	were	
spies	assisting	the	rebels	and	refused	to	release	them	in	a	timely	matter.9	
	 When	 it	 came	 to	 raising	 the	 diplomatic	 and	 emotional	 heat	 no	 one	 was	
better	suited	to	the	task	than	the	great	Cuban	revolutionary,	Jose	Marti.		Much	has	
been	written	about	this	intriguing	figure	but	one	of	the	most	important	services	he	
performed	for	his	country	was	in	getting	the	people	of	Florida,	and	especially	Tampa,	
directly	involved	in	supporting	the	revolution.		As	historian	Joan	Steffy	has	written:	
“Thus	it	was	Tampa	which	became	the	catalyst	for	the	movement	to	join	all	Cubans	
in	the	struggle	 for	 independence.	 	It	was	 in	Tampa	that	Marti	proposed	his	 ideals	
of	national	unity,	of	democratic	revolutionary	activity,	and	the	joining	of	all	groups	
under	 a	 common	 banner.”	 	 It	 was	 also	 in	Tampa	 where	 the	 Spanish	 government	
allegedly	attempted	to	assassinate	the	writer-turned-revolutionary	by	poisoning	his	
wine.		From	that	time	on	each	visit	to	Tampa	found	him	in	the	home	of	Ruperto	
and	Paulina	Pedroso,	an	African-Cuban	couple	whom	Marti	trusted.		Marti’s	interest	
in	Tampa	was	the	cigar-workers	and	their	associations.		In	these	he	found	followers	
and	contributors	to	the	extent	that	the	money	donated	by	the	people	of	Tampa	and	
Key	West	grossed	more	than	that	received	from	all	other	Latin	American	countries	
combined.		Almost	all	of	the	funds	raised	went	to	the	purchase	of	arms,	ammunition	
and	medical	supplies	for	the	revolutionary	army	in	Cuba.10	
	 Tampa	was	looked	upon	as	“the	very	heart	of	the	American	conspiracy,”	to	free	
Cuba	from	Spanish	control.11		It	was	in	Tampa	that	Marti	announced	the	creation	
of	the	Cuban	Revolutionary	Party	(PRC)	and	the	place	where	the	party	organization	
began	to	take	shape	in	the	form	of	many	localized	“juntas”.		Many	of	the	local	juntas,	
organized	by	the	cigar	workers	and	some	of	the	manufacturers,	were	actively	involved	
in	fund	raising	and	campaigning	on	behalf	of	Cuban	independence.		More	directly	
some	 of	 the	 juntas	 in	Tampa	 and	 elsewhere	 “coordinated	 support	 of	 filibustering	
expeditions	 leaving	Florida	 for	Cuba.”12	 	That	 these	organizations	were	 infiltrated	
by	Spanish	spies	is	undoubted	but	they	were	remarkably	tight	in	their	local	security	
measures.	
One	of	the	stories	of	clandestine	warfare,	the	notification	of	the	revolutionaries	
in	Cuba	that	the	“grito	de	Guerra”	was	to	begin,	was	sent	wrapped	in	a	special	cigar	
marked	by	two	tine	yellow	specks	by	Blas	O’Halloran	in	the	O”Halloran	cigar	factory	
in	West	Tampa.		Miguel	Angel	Duque	de	Estrada	carried	the	message	through	the	
9	 	United	States	Senate	Document	No.	16.	54th	Congress,	1st	Session.	1896.		Serial	Set	3353.
10	 	 Joan	 Marie	 Steffy.	 “The	 Cuban	 Immigrants	 of	 Tampa,	 Florida:	 1886-1898.”	 Masters	 Thesis.	
University	 of	 South	 Florida,	 1975,	 43-74.	The	 author	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 Consuelo	 Stebbins	 at	 the	
University	of	Central	Florida	for	sharing	her	work	regarding	the	Cuban	Revolutionary	parties	in	Tampa	
and	Key	West	during	this	time	period.
11	 	Steffy,	78.
12	 	Louis	A.	Perez,	Jr.	“Cubans	in	Tampa:	From	Exiles	to	Immigrants,	1892-1901.”	Florida Historical 
Quarterly.	Volume	57,	October	1978,	133-134.
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tight	Spanish	customs	office	and	delivered	the	message	to	Juan	Galberto	Gomez	who	
set	the	final	date	for	February	24,	1895.13		Recent	scholarship	and	the	publication	
in	Havana	of	Juan	Gualberto	Gomez’s	memoirs	have	brought	 to	 light	 the	 facts	 in	
this	matter.		In	actuality	the	message	was	too	large	for	any	cigar	to	hold	and	it	did	
not	go	through	the	closely	watched	Tampa	Juntas	but	it	was	sent	through	the	more	
tightly	controlled	Cuban	Convention	in	Key	West.		The	chain	of	curriers	began	with	
Gonzola	de	Quedada	in	New	York	through	to	Juan	de	Barrios	thence	to	Manuel	de	
la	Cruz	who	delivered	the	final	message	in	Cuba	to	Gomez.	 	Although	these	men	
were	known	to	the	Spanish	officials	their	quick	and	silent	work	within	the	growing	
network	made	their	mission	a	success.14
	 Publication	 of	 the	 Spanish	 correspondence	 between	 its	 Consuls	 and	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Ultramar	 by	 Dr.	 Consuelo	 E.	 Stebbins	 indicates	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	
intrigue	 at	 this	 stage.	 	 Since	 many	 of	 the	 revolutionaries	 were	 participants	 in	 the	
Ten	Years	War	it	was	somewhat	easier	to	follow	them	and	report	on	their	contacts	in	
Tampa	and	Key	West.		In	a	report	dated	March	8,	1895,	Pedro	Solis,	the	Consul	in	
Key	West	noted:	“This	consulate	is	closely	observing	and	reporting	on	the	activities	
of	the	Separatists,	not	only	in	Key	West	but	also	in	Tampa	and	other	cities	in	Florida.	
Since	I	assumed	the	responsibility	of	this	office	several	years	ago,	I	have	maintained	
constant	surveillance	of	the	insurgents,	and	I	have	sent	detailed	reports	of	their	plans	
to	 Cuba	 and	 Washington	 D.	 C.	 …”	 	 Solis	 then	 noted	 the	 eminent	 threat	 of	 an	
expedition	to	be	led	by	Generals	Carlos	Roloff	and	Serafin	Sanchez.		It	left	Big	Pine	
Key	and	landed	in	Las	Villas	province	on	July	24,	1895.		Even	with	foreknowledge	the	
consul	could	do	little	but	inform	those	in	charge	of	enforcement.15		The	documents	
clearly	show	an	active	consular	service	but	also	the	constant	frustration	it	experienced	
in	 trying	 to	halt	 the	numerous	 filibustering	expeditions	or	 the	 revolutionary	 fund	
raising	 especially	 by	 the	 cells	 of	 the	 Central	 Revolutionary	 Council	 in	 Key	 West	
or	the	numerous	clubs	in	Tampa.16		Even	when	Enrique	Collazo	was	“organizing	a	
council	of	war	in	Tampa,”	the	frustrated	consul,	M.	R.	Esudero,	was	advised	not	to	
even	press	charges	as	it	would	be	a	waste	of	time	and	money.		Convinced	that	this	
assessment	of	the	situation	was	accurate	the	consul	did	not	press	for	charges	knowing	
that	no	conviction	could	be	won	against	the	insurgents	who	had	the	support	of	the	
populace	in	both	Key	West	and	Tampa.17
13	 	Steffy.,	79-80.
14	 	 Consuelo	 E.	 Stebbins.	 “Key	West	 Declares	War	 on	 Spain.”	 	 Unpublished	 paper	 delivered	 to	 the	
Florida	Historical	Society	annual	meeting,	Clearwater,	Florida,	May	26,	2007.		See	also	Juan	Gualberto	
Gomez.	Por Cuba Libre.	Havana:	1905.	348-349:	and	Manuel	Deulofeu.	Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa.	
Cienfuego.	ND.	285.	 	The	author	would	 like	 to	 thank	Dr.	Stebbins	 for	her	 assistance	 in	 seeing	 these	
sources	and	sharing	her	work	in	progress.
15	 	Consuelo	E.	Stebbins.	City of Intrigue, Nest of Revolution: A Documentary History of Key West in the 
Nineteenth Century.	Gainesville:	University	Press	of	Florida,	2007.,	183.
16	 	Ibid.,	177-233.
17	 	Ibid.,	232.
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This	map	shows	the	proximity	of	the	various	encampments,	the	docks	at	Port	Tampa	City	and	the	City	of	
Tampa.		Henry	Plant’s	single	track	railroad,	connecting	Tampa	and	Port	Tampa,	was	overwhelmed	by	the	
number	of	people	and	amount	of	supplies	that	had	to	travel	its	nine-mile	length.	
Tony Pizzo Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department
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Filibustering relied upon secrecy and tact in the face of constant observation.  The 
Ten Year War had proven that the Spanish Navy could not stop all such traffic and 
this was to be true in the War for Independence too.  However, Marti and company 
were not always successful in getting their arms and supplies to their compatriots 
in Cuba.  In one of the most conspicuous captures made by the Spanish and 
American customs agents during the period before United States intervention the 
insurrectionists were stopped in mid-shipment in Fernandina.  Simply put the plot 
at hand was the smuggling of arms and ammunition to Cuba through the sleepy 
port of Fernandina, which had little in the way of military shipping in early 1895. 
Marti, using the name of D. E. Mantell, a wealthy “Englishman” about to sail on a 
cruise to the West Indies, chartered the yacht Lagonda through the good offices of his 
friend, Nathaniel Barnett Borden, a prominent Fernandina businessman.  Borden’s 
warehouse held a number of ammunition crates variously labeled and destined for 
the Lagonda.  Two other vessels were hired for the adventure, the Amadis, out of 
Rockland, Maine, and tramp steamer Baracoa then in harbor at Boston.  The latter 
was hired out to one “Abe Moreas of Tampa.  The claim of Borden was that around 
two hundred men, laborers, would be picked up at various ports in the West Indies 
and transported to work on one of the islands, name unspecified.  Such uncertainty 
aroused the suspicions of one of the captains.  The New York World got wind of the 
sailing of the Lagonda and alerted its Fernandina correspondent, T. A. Hall, to be on 
the look out for anything suspicious because rumor on the New York docks had it 
that a filibustering expedition might be sailing from the quiet port.  Hall, a county 
judge, showed this dispatch to the local Collector of Customs, George L. Baltzell 
who began to pay closer attention to the comings and goings of some newly arrived 
vessels.  In New York City, an informant, James Batewell, wrote to Secretary of the 
Treasury John G. Carlisle, that the Lagonda and the Amadis had been chartered for 
a filibustering expedition.  The fate of the expedition was therefore sealed before the 
arrival of the final ship.  The agents of the customs service, including special agent S. 
W. Paul of Tampa, descended upon Borden’s warehouse and seized the vessels in the 
harbor.  The expedition had been crushed.  However, it did have a positive impact on 
the Cuban cause and, as historian Antonio Rafael de la Cova has noted, it inspired 
the cause with greater energy and determination to organize even more expeditions 
to obtain national independence for Cuba.18
For many in the United States the first real indication that the nation had 
an intelligence network was the assignment given to Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan. 
Rowan was perfect for the job which entailed getting into Cuba, making contact 
with General Calixto Garcia Iniguez, commander of Cuban forces in the eastern end 
of the island.  Like many others who preceded him to the island, he took advantage 
18  Antonio de la Cova. “Fernandina Filibuster Fiasco: Birth of the 1895 Cuban War of Independence.” 
Florida Historical Quarterly. Volume 82, September 2003., 16-42.  Also see Enrique Collazo. Cuba Heroica. 
Havana, Cuba. 1911., 170-172.
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of	the	network	established	by	the	filibusterers	in	obtaining	passage	to	Cuba.		Rowan	
had	experience	at	intelligence	gathering	in	the	field	having	made	an	inspection	of	the	
entire	length	of	the	Canadian	Pacific	Railroad.		He	also	had	experience	in	Cuba	and	
authored	a	book	on	the	island’s	resources.		In	addition	to	contacting	Garcia	Rowan	
was	also	to	attempt	to	contact	General	Maximo	Gomez	y	Baez	the	leading	military	
officer	in	the	insurgent	ranks	and,	like	Garcia,	a	holdover	from	the	“Ten	Year’s	War”	
from	 1868-1879.	 	 Rowan’s	 mission	 was	 an	 overwhelming	 success	 but	 hardly	 the	
daring-do	adventure	written	up	in	the	famous	“Message	to	Garcia”	piece	of	Elbert	
Hubbard.		Garcia	was	to	give	Rowan	the	layout	of	the	Spanish	forces	on	the	island,	
their	numbers,	weapons,	dispositions,	etc.		For	MID	this	was	not	all	new	information	
but	it	supplemented	that	which	was	already	known	through	other	Cuban	sources,	
namely	the	exiles	in	Florida	and	New	York.19			For	Americans	reading	the	adventure	
published	by	Hubbard,	it	romanticized	the	roles	of	the	filibusterers	and	others	daring	
to	flaunt	the	power	of	Spain.
On	a	 less	adventuresome	 level,	 local	 intelligence	gathering	took	on	some	
typically	 peculiar	 twists.	 	 In	 her	 charmingly	 brief	 “My	 Service	 in	 the	 Spanish-
American	War,	1898,”	Mabel	Bean	(Williams)	tells	her	story	of	minor	but	important	
espionage.		Ms.	Bean	worked	in	her	father’s	store	and	post	office	at	Port	Tampa.		After	
describing	the	impact	of	thousands	of	troops	descending	upon	the	town	she	tells	of	
her	sitting	in	the	family	parlor	when	Colonel	Groesbeck	arrived.		The	Colonel	was	an	
old	friend	of	her	parents	and	could	be	trusted	to	look	after	the	young	lady	in	her	new	
role	–	following	the	activities	and	mailings	of	two	well-known	Spaniards	suspecting	
of	spying	on	the	operations	in	Tampa.		These	men	were	regular	customers	and	often	
seen	in	the	vicinity.	Her	job	was	relatively	simple.		Keep	an	eye	on	these	men	and	
search	 their	mail.	 	 She	was	 to	 report	her	 findings	 to	General	William	R.	 Shafter,	
Commander	of	Fifth	Corps,	personally.		There	she	often	translated	the	documents	
for	the	general	and	presumably	his	staff.		The	bright	young,	curly	headed	girl	in	the	
trim	sailor	suit	would	hardly	be	suspected	of	being	a	spy	by	the	men	and	that	was	
what	Groesbeck	expected.		As	she	summed	up	her	experience:	“Gen.	Shafter,	Col.	
Groesbeck	and	my	father	all	seemed	pleased	with	the	work	I	had	done	but	I	couldn’t	
see	that	it	amounted	to	much.		Perhaps	it	did	prevent	contraband	information	from	
going	through	the	mail.”		Whatever	she	delivered	it	had	to	account	for	more	than	just	
general	information	for	her	to	be	reporting	it	directly	to	the	commanding	officer.		In	
espionage	little	things	add	up	to	larger	things	and	in	the	bigger	picture	it	could	be	
very	important.20
19	 	G.	J.	A.	O’Toole.	Honorable Treachery: A History of U. S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action 
from the American Revolution to the CIA..	New	York:	Morgan	Entrekin	Books,	1991.	194-195.		Also	see	
Willliam	R.	Corson.	The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire.	New	York:	The	
Dial	Press,	1977.,	46.
20	 	 Mabel	 C.	 Bean.	 “My	 Service	 in	 the	 Spanish-American	 War,	 1898.”	 Tampa,	 Florida:	 Historical	
Records	Survey,	State	Archives	Survey,	1937.,	4-7.
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	 Few	 areas	 indicate	
the	nature	of	the	intelligence	
war	 during	 the	 Cuban	
Revolution	and	the	Spanish-
American	War	of	1898	than	
the	 episodes	 involving	 the	
filibusterers,	 most	 leaving	
from	 Florida	 ports.	 	 The	
United	 States	 was	 neutral	
in	 the	 war	 between	 Cuban	
insurgents	 and	 the	 Spanish	
government	 and	 therefore	
was	required	by	international	
law	 to	 forbid	 and	 prohibit	
such	exploits	as	filibustering.	
Raids	 into	 Cuba	 from	 the	
United	 States	 were	 of	 long	
tradition.		The	most	famous	
of	the	early	expeditions	were	
those	 of	 Narciso	 López	 in	
the	 period	 from	 1849-52.	
During	 the	 Ten	 Years	 War	
there	 were	 many	 attempts	
to	 get	 arms	 to	 the	 Cuban	
insurgents	 and	 many	 of	
these	came	from	Florida	and	
Louisiana.		The	most	famous	
affair	 in	 this	 era	 came	 with	
the	 capture	 and	 execution	
of	 Captain	 Fry	 and	 the	 crew	
of	 the	 Virginius.	 	 As	 soon	 as	
the	 war	 of	 1895	 began	 the	
boats	 coming	 from	 Florida,	 New	 York,	 Pennsylvania	 and	 other	 points	 along	 the	
eastern	coast	of	the	United	States	appeared	to	be	a	continuous	flotilla.		The	Revenue	
Service	was	drawn	into	a	constant	game	of	cat	and	mouse	all	along	the	coast.		The	
Morrill,	the	McLane,	the	Forward	and	the	Hamilton	all	attempted	to	halt	the	traffic	
in	arms,	ammunition	and	men	headed	for	Cuba.		They	received	constant	tips	from	
the	 Spanish	 Ambassador,	 the	 Spanish	 Consular	 service	 and	 numerous	 spies	 up	
and	down	the	coastline.	 	The	George W. Childs,	 the	Lark,	 the	Commodore	and	the	
Laurada	were	all	part	of	the	early	ships	attempting	to	land	articles	of	war	and	men	
on	Cuba’s	beleaguered	shores.		In	November,	for	example,	the	Spanish	Ambassador	
requested	that	the	Customs	Service	detain	and	search	the	James W. Foster	as	she	sat	
The	 Starry Flag Weekly	 was	 a	 popular	 Dime	 Novel	 during	 the	
time	of	the	Spanish-American	War.		Though	“Tampa’s	Dynamite	
Fiend”	was	a	fictional	story,	the	threat	of	Spanish	saboteurs	was	
on	the	minds	of	many	Americans	during	this	time.
Dime Novel Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department
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off	 of	 the	 Delaware	 Breakwater.	 	 In	 January	 of	 1896	 the	 Spanish	 minister	 stated	
that	the	steamer	J. W. Hawkins	was	 just	 leaving	New	York	to	rendezvous	with	the	
Commodore	 somewhere	 near	 Palm	 Beach	 and	 that	 the	 arms	 confiscated	 earlier	 at	
Cedar	Keys	figured	into	the	mix	headed	towards	Garcia’s	army.		By	March	of	that	
year	the	minister	was	complaining	once	more	about	the	schooner	S. R. Mallory	taking	
its	cargo	from	Cedar	Keys	to	meet	with	the	schooner	Adel	off	of	Tampa	where	they	
would	later	connect	with	the	famous	Three Friends	which	would	make	the	final	leg	
to	Cuba.		This	last	exploit	even	stated	that	the	S. R. Mallory	contained	thirty	tons	
of	supplies	for	the	insurgents	and	that	the	Adel	was	transporting	Enrique	Collo	and	
a	body	of	men	to	join	up	with	the	Three Friends	after	leaving	Longboat	Key	(stated	
as	Longport	Inlet	in	the	report)	and	rendezvousing	somewhere	near	Alligator	Key.	
Such	 specific	 information	 could	 only	 have	 come	 from	 a	 rather	 sophisticated	 spy	
network	operating	out	of	Tampa	and	Jacksonville.		The	S. R. Mallory	was	seized	in	
this	instance	but	soon	released	for	lack	of	direct	evidence	showing	a	violation	of	the	
neutrality	laws.21
	 According	to	a	report	to	the	House	of	Representatives	given	in	February	of	
1898	the	U.	S.	Customs	Service	allegedly	put	its	entire	eastern	force	of	2,408	men	
onto	the	task	of	suppressing	the	trade	in	arms	and	the	shipment	of	men	to	Cuba.	
This	same	report	stated:	“That	only	6	out	of	13,585	American	vessels	succeeded	in	
reaching	Cuba	and	that	less	than	50	have	had	any	share	in	these	expeditions	…”		It	
bragged	 that	 the	U.	S.	 citizens	were	 thereby	proven	 to	be	 law	abiding	 and	 that	 a	
“wholesome	and	repressive	fear”	kept	those	more	disposed	to	undertake	such	action	
in	line.		The	Service	even	produced	an	impressive	chart	to	show	the	results	of	sixty	
attempted	expeditions,	which	it	claimed	very	few	ever	reached	Cuba.		According	to	
Dr.	Samuel	Proctor,	Napoleon	Bonaparte	Broward’s	biographer,	 the	Three Friends	
alone	had	 eight	 successful	 voyages	 to	Cuba	providing	weapons,	men	and	hospital	
supplies	to	the	insurgent	army.22		The	Three Friends	was	assigned	a	“shadow”	in	the	
Revenue	Cutter	Boutwell	while	in	Jacksonville,	however	there	were	many	well	known	
escapades	where	the	captain	of	this	cutter	simply	waived	goodbye	after	Three Friends	
crossed	the	bar.	 	The	same	report	stating	that	the	Revenue	Service	had	stopped	so	
many	of	the	expeditions	also	noted	how	many	times	(complete	with	dates)	these	same	
vessels	actually	delivered	their	cargoes	to	Cuba.		In	light	of	most	of	the	evidence	and	
the	numerous	newspaper	reports	of	these	exploits	the	report	can	only	be	viewed	as	
“window	dressing”	for	the	Spanish	government	and	an	answer	to	its	charges	that	the	
United	States	had	been	too	lenient	with	the	violators.23
	 The	Cuban	Revolution	of	1895-1898	was	 financed	heavily	by	Cubans	and	
their	sympathizers	in	the	United	States,	especially	in	Tampa	and	Key	West,	Florida.	
21	 	United	States	Senate	Document	No.	180.	54th	Congress,	1st	Session,	1896.	Serial	Set	3353.
22	 	Samuel	Proctor.	 “Filibustering	Aboard	 the	Three Friends.”	Broward Legacy.	Volume	4,	Spring/Fall	
1981.,	19.
23	 	United	States	House	of	Representatives	Document	No.	326.	55th	Congress,	2d	Session,	February	28,	
1898.	Serial	Set	3679.
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Many	of	the	funds	raised	by	the	efforts	of	the	Cuban	Junta	and	its	numerous	sub-
organizations	 went	 directly	 to	 fund	 the	 guns,	 ammunition	 and	 hospital	 goods	
shipped	 by	 the	 filibusterers.	 	 According	 to	 historian	 James	 Robertson,	 “General	
Maximo	 Gomez,	 commander-in-chief	 of	 the	 Cuban	 Army,	 early	 and	 continually	
emphasized	the	importance	and	necessity	of	promoting	filibustering	as	a	means	of	
sustaining	the	revolutionary	movement,	…”24		Cuban	historian	Jose	Rivero	Muniz	
has	also	noted	that	even	though	the	attempts	to	raise	money	for	the	revolution	were	
publicly	known	and	promoted	in	the	local	press,	United	States	authorities	did	little	
if	anything	to	prevent	them.		The	nearly	constant	military	preparations	which	the	
Spanish	 Ambassador	 and	 others	 denounced	 and	 demanded	 a	 halt	 to	 were	 almost	
totally	ignored	by	the	powers	in	Washington	and	throughout	Florida.		Clearly	the	
sympathy	and	admiration	for	the	Cuban	cause	was	one	that	struck	a	responsive	cord	
in	the	hearts	of	Floridians	and	other	citizens.25		Tampa’s	denizens	in	particular	were	
very	supportive	of	the	Cuban	cause	and	donated	as	much	from	this	one	town	as	was	
raised	in	all	the	other	Americas.26			Indeed,	the	cigar-makers	of	Tampa	contributed	the	
astounding	amount	of	twelve	to	fifteen	thousand	dollars	per	month,	or	$150,000	per	
year	(in	round	numbers).27		The	centers	of	Cuban	emigrant	population,	Tampa,	Key	
West	and	New	York	were	the	most	fertile	fields	for	fund-raising.		With	a	combined	
population	of	over	8,000	Cubans	Tampa	and	Key	West	were	quick	to	raise	needed	
funds.28
	 Probably	the	most	famous	intelligence	coup	of	the	war	came	with	the	discovery	
of	the	whereabouts	of	the	fleet	of	Admiral	Pascual	Cervera	y	Topete.		This	fleet	was	well	
undermanned,	incomplete	in	composition	and	did	not	have	all	of	its	guns	and	turrets	
in	place,	yet	as	a	“fleet	 in	being”	 it	presented	a	threat,	especially	to	the	frightened	
and	nearly	hysterical	governors	of	the	New	England	states	who	feared	the	bombing	
of	Plymouth	or	some	other	coastal	community.		It	had	to	be	found	and	destroyed	
before	a	land	invasion	of	Cuba	could	be	attempted	because	the	Army	could	not	sail	
unprotected	to	Cuba	in	open	boats.		Two	operatives	of	the	Navy	Department,	not	
linked	to	ONI,	were	Ensigns	Henry	H.	Ward	and	William	H.	Buck	who	chartered	
yachts	to	cruise	off	of	the	Spanish	coast	and	keep	watch	on	the	fleets	of	Cervera	and	
Admiral	Miguel	de	la	Camara.		Thrown	into	the	intelligence	mix	in	Europe	were	the	
various	operatives	of	the	Naval	Attaches,	including	Edward	Breck,	a	former	fencing	
champion	who	went	in	disguise	to	Spain	and	played	the	role	to	the	hilt	and	did	not	
get	caught.		Unfortunately,	none	of	these	operatives	or	attaches	could	locate	the	vital	
fleet	of	Cervera	once	it	 left	the	Cape	Verde	Islands.	 	Not	until	 it	reached	Curacao	
on	14	May	1898	did	the	United	States	Navy	have	an	idea	where	it	was	headed.		It	
24	 	George	W.	Auxier.	 “The	Propaganda	Activities	 of	 the	Cuban	 Junta	 in	Precipitating	 the	Spanish-
American	War,	1895-1898.”	Hispanic American Historical Review.	Volume	19,	1939.,	288-89.
25	 	 Jose	 Rivero	 Muniz.	 The Ybor City Story (1885-1954).	Tampa:	 E.	 Fernandez	 and	 Henry	 Beltran	
publishers,	1976.,	25.
26	 	Gary	R.	Mormino	and	George	E.	Pozzetta.	The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and Their Latin 
Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985.	Gainesville:	University	Press	of	Florida,	1998	edition.,	80.
27	 	Muniz,	101.
28	 	 Marshall	 M.	True.	 Revolutionaries in Exile: The Cuban Revolutionary Party, 1891-1898.	 Doctoral	
Dissertation,	University	of	Virginia.	1965.,	172.	
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had	been	assumed	that	Cervera	would	head	to	Havana	where	coal	and	naval	stores	
awaited	him.	 	The	North	Atlantic	Fleet,	under	Admiral	William	T.	Sampson	was	
charged	with	the	blockade	of	Cuba,	especially	the	northern	coast.		The	blockade	was	
extended	east	and	west	of	the	capital	city	but	covered	little	of	the	southern	coast.		The	
second	assumption	was	that	if	not	Havana	then	Cienfuegos	would	be	the	next	logical	
port	of	call.		The	“Flying	Squadron”	under	Admiral	Winfield	Scott	Schley	was	called	
upon	to	prevent	this	possibility.		Yet,	for	ten	complete	days,	so	the	old	story	goes,	the	
fleet	of	Admiral	Cervera	was	lost	to	Naval	Intelligence.29		This	is	surely	not	the	case.	
	 At	 the	 official	 declaration	 of	 war	 President	William	 McKinley	 ordered	 the	
head	of	the	U.	S.	Army	Signal	Corps,	A.	W.	Greely	to	take	control	of	all	telegraphic	
lines	in	the	country.		This	order	included	both	cable	and	land	lines.		Most	important	
were	 those	 from	Havana	 to	Key	West	 and	 from	Cienfuegos	 to	Haiti.	 	This	 latter	
was	cut	under	severe	circumstances	on	11	May.		The	line	from	Havana	to	Key	West	
was	 not	 cut	 during	 the	 war	 for	 good	 reason,	 it	 provided	 too	 much	 intelligence,	
including	on	19	May	the	arrival	of	Cervera’s	fleet	in	the	harbor	at	Santiago	de	Cuba.	
Captain	James	Allen	had	been	assigned	to	Key	West	and	this	energetic	officer	soon	
recruited	the	local	manager	of	the	telegraphic	service,	Martin	L.	Hellings.		Hellings	
immediately	offered	his	services	and	those	of	his	men	in	Havana,	in	whom	he	had	
explicit	trust.		He	had	done	the	same	for	Captain	Charles	Sigsbee	arrived	in	Key	West	
with	the	battleship	Maine.	 	Besides	 the	control	of	 the	official	 telegraph	office	and	
staff,	Allen	now	had	access	through	to	the	highest	offices	in	Cuba.		It	was	through	one	
of	these	operatives,	named	Villaril	that	the	arrival	of	Cervera’s	fleet	became	known.	
This	information	was	immediately	sent	to	Washington	where	Greely	states	he	gave	
his	assurance	 to	 the	President	and	Secretary	of	 the	Navy	Long	that	 it	was	 for	 real	
and	reliable.30		Commodore	George	C.	Remey,	then	commanding	at	Key	West,	was	
given	the	information	directly	and	he	also	vouched	for	its	authenticity.		As	Remey	
related:	“The	next	morning,	May	19th,	about	9	A.M.	Captain	Allen	U.S.A.	the	chief	
Signal	Office,	came,	excited,	and	evidently	in	great	haste,	and	said	that	[he]	had	a	
very	important	dispatch	to	tell	me.		So	I	cleared	the	room,	and	he	informed	me	that	
his	office	had,	a	few	minutes	before,	received	a	telegram	from	Havana,	stating	that	
Admiral	Cervera’s	fleet	was	entering	the	harbor	of	Santiago	de	Cuba.”		Remey	then	
sent	the	message	onto	Washington	where,	he	later	learned,	the	officer	of	the	day	at	
the	Navy	Department	did	not	believe	the	story	until	he	got	several	stories	over	the	
next	few	hours.31		Admiral	Sampson	was	notified	of	the	event	and	he	soon	sent	his	
message	to	Schley,	 then	on	the	way	to	Cienfuegos,	 to	continue	on	to	Santiago	de	
Cuba	and	blockade	that	port.	 	Schley	did	not	believe	the	story	either	and	delayed	
for	several	days	before	actually	confirming	the	story	by	direct	observations	done	by	
29	 	Dorwart,	64-65;	and	O’Toole,	195-97.
30	 	 O’Toole,	 188-90.	 	 Also	 see	 A.	 W.	 Greely.	 “The	 Signal	 Corps	 in	 War-Time.”	 Century Magazine.	
Volume	66,	October,	1903.,	816-17.
31	 	Charles	Mason	Remey.	Some Exerpts from the Life and Letters of Rear Admiral George Collier Remey, 
United States Navy, 1841-1928.	 Washington:	 Self-published,	 1939.,	 43-46.	 	 Copy	 obtained	 from	 the	
Monroe	 County	 Public	 Library,	 Key	 West,	 Florida.	 	 See	 also	 Rebecca	 R.	 Raines.	 Getting the Message 
Through: A Branch History of the U. S. Army Signal Corps.Washington:	Center	of	Military	History,	United	
States	Army,	1996.,	88-90.
        
15
Knetsch: Florida, Cuba And The Spanish–American War: The Intelligence Game
Published by Scholar Commons, 2007
70										Tampa	Bay	History
Lieutenant	Blue	aided	by	his	Cuban	guide.		Inner-service	rivalry	appears	to	have	been	
the	culprit	 in	not	getting	Schley	 into	position	earlier	and	the	fact	 that	Schley	was	
upset	that	Sampson	was	over	him	even	though	he	had	longer	service	made	it	doubly	
bad	and	forced	the	two	men	into	a	disagreement	that	led	to	Congressional	hearings	
and	public	disgust.	 		
	 A	final	note	to	this	episode	came	with	the	publication	of	Willis	Moore’s	account	
of	 the	founding	of	the	West	Indian	Weather	Service,	a	branch	of	the	Department	
of	 Agriculture.	 	 According	 to	 Moore’s	 story,	 the	 important	 message	 was	 encoded	
into	the	weather	observations	from	Belene	College	in	Havana	and	deciphered	at	Key	
West.		If	this	is	the	case	the	President’s	fear	of	a	hurricane	and	its	effects	on	the	fleet	
made	an	important	contribution	to	the	war	effort.32
	 In	one	of	the	strangest	fetes	of	imagination	the	Cuban	Army	does	not	receive	
any	credit	for	its	role	in	the	five	month	campaign	conducted	by	the	United	States	
in	Cuba	which	brought	about	the	end	to	the	Cuban	Revolution	and	the	Spanish-
American	 War.	 	The	 movement	 of	 Fifth	 Corps,	 under	 the	 command	 of	 General	
William	 Rufus	 Shafter,	 was	 slow	 and	 ponderous.	 	There	 was	 little	 secret	 as	 to	 its	
destination	once	Cervera	was	bottled	up	on	Santiago’s	narrow	harbor.		Prior	to	their	
leaving	Tampa	the	S. S. Florida	took	312	Cuban	volunteers	from	Tampa	and	other	
Florida	cities	and	landed	them	near	Banes.		The	Rowan	mission	had	also	introduced	
General	Nelson	Miles	to	two	of	Garcia’s	most	trusted	subordinates,	General	Enrique	
Collazo	and	Lieutenant	Colonel	Carlos	Hernandez.		These	gentlemen	gave	the	Major	
General	some	of	the	most	vital	information	on	the	strength	of	the	Spanish	forces	near	
Santiago,	 the	 entrenchments	 and	 the	possible	 reinforcements	 available	 to	General	
Linares	commanding	Santiago.		Miles	sent	a	message	back	to	Garcia	and	asked	him	
to	provide	more	details	and	broached	possible	cooperation.		Garcia	replied	on	9	June	
that	he	would	consider	Miles’	orders	as	his	orders	and	cooperate	any	way	he	could.	
He	offered	almost	exact	numbers	of	Spanish	troops	in	the	area	and	promised	to	hold	
the	forces	at	Holguin	in	place.		When	Shafter	and	the	Fifth	Corps	finally	arrived,	the	
officers	immediately	disembarked	and	rowed	to	shore	to	meet	with	Garcia	unopposed	
by	any	Spanish	guns.		Garcia’s	forces	had	cleared	the	area	before	the	shelling	of	the	
“forts”	by	Schley’s	fleet	and	few	were	left	to	oppose	either	the	officers’	landing	or	the	
disembarking	of	 the	Fifth	Corps.	 	Reinforcements	 from	Manzanillo,	Holguin	and	
Guantanamo	had	been	blocked	by	smaller	forces	under	Garcia.		When	Shafter	and	
the	Army	landed	at	Daiquiri	and	Siboney	on	22-24	June	they	were	unopposed.		All	
of	this	thanks	to	Garcia’s	forces	and	a	feint	of	about	500	men	attacking	from	the	west	
of	Santiago	under	his	command.		Miles	acknowledged	the	contribution	of	the	Cuban	
Army	and	noted	that	they	held	the	most	strategic	locations	on	the	western	side	of	the	
town	and	harbor	and	assisted	in	the	assault	on	the	entrenchments	before	the	town.33	
Yet	no	where	do	you	see	this	contribution	mentioned	in	the	text	giving	the	history	of	
this	war.
32	 	Willis	Luther	Moore.	“I	Am	Thinking	of	Hurricanes.”	The American Mercury.	Volume	12,	September	
1927.,	81-82.
33	 	House	of	Representatives	Document	No.	2.	55th	Congress,	3d	Session.	Annual	Report	of	the	War	
Department,	Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	1898.,	27-28.
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	 This	 cursory	 review	 of	 the	 Cuban	 Revolution	 and	 the	 Spanish-American	
War’s	intelligence	battles	is	not	meant	to	be	all	inclusive.		However	it	should	bring	
questions	to	mind	as	to	why	Shafter,	Miley	and	others	testified	in	front	of	the	Dodge	
Commission	into	the	Conduct	of	the	War	that	they	had	little	intelligence	concerning	
the	forces	in	front	of	them.		Given	the	“Military	Notes	on	Cuba”	compiled	so	carefully	
by	Scriven,	the	very	large	number	of	exiles	willing	to	give	information,	the	forces	of	
Garcia	and	Gomez	who	assisted	in	the	landing	of	United	States	troops	and	the	nearly	
four	hundred	years	of	interaction	with	the	island	these	assertions	ring	very	hollow.	
An	American	officer	questions	an	alleged	Spanish	spy	in	this	drawing	dating	from	the	Spanish-American	
War.	
from The	Story	of	the	Spanish-American	War by W. Nephew King (1898)
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Almost	every	harbor	and	the	road	network	surrounding	it	were	mapped	and	available	
to	the	commanding	officers.		The	train	schedule	and	other	transportation	facilities	
were	well	known	as	was	the	topography	of	most	of	the	island.		The	Consular	reports	
and	the	information	gleaned	from	our	attaché	corps	added	even	more	depth	to	the	
available	knowledge.	 	To	make	the	claim	that	there	was	 little	 intelligence	to	use	 is	
almost	ludicrous.		
	 In	 one	 of	 the	 more	 revealing	 letters	 of	 the	 day,	 Brigadier	 General	William	
Ludlow,	 then	 Chief	 Engineer,	 wrote	 to	 Adjutant	 General	 Henry	 T.	 Corbin	 the	
following:	“The	Spanish	strength	has	been	greatly	exaggerated.		They	claim	to	have	
had	250,000	troops.		They	never	had	them.		They	have	existed	on	paper	doubtless,	
and	drawn	pay,	but	150,000	would	cover	all	they	had.		Of	these,	many	have	been	sent	
home,	many	have	been	killed,	and	very	many	have	died	of	disease	in	their	filthy	and	
unsanitary	barracks	and	hospitals.”		Ludlow	continued:	“At	this	time,	from	detailed	
and	 specific	 information,	 checked	 from	 several	 well	 informed	 sources,	 I	 cannot	
find	more	than	70,000	Spanish	soldiers	in	the	entire	island	of	Cuba,	and	these	are	
divided	into	scattered	garrisons.		I	can	approximately	locate	them	from	recent	data.”	
Ludlow	 then	became	very	 specific	 as	 to	how	many	 forces	were	 in	what	 locations.	
Most	 importantly	 for	 the	 operations	 around	 Santiago,	 he	 noted	 that	 the	 eastern	
troops	 were	 almost	 totally	 isolated	 from	 the	 middle	 and	 western	 groups	 and	 that	
the	transportation	system	did	not	allow	any	rapid	consolidation	or	concentration	of	
Spanish	forces.		He	also	speculated	that	it	would	be	very	difficult,	even	with	four	rail	
lines	leading	into	Havana	to	concentrate	any	more	than	40,000	troops	for	the	capital’s	
defense.	 	General	Ludlow	then	stated	that	with	the	Spanish	treasury	nearly	broke,	
the	 fall	 of	Manila	 in	 everyone’s	mind,	 the	 constant	 sighting	of	 the	Navy	 cruising	
along	the	coast	intercepting	all	traffic,	knowledge	that	their	fleet	was	bottled	up	in	
Santiago	and	knowing	that	the	Cubans	were	constantly	being	further	supplied	by	the	
expeditions	sent	by	the	Army	and	supporters	in	the	United	States	that	the	only	course	
open	to	thinking	Spaniards	in	Cuba	was	a	rapid	capitulation.		The	letter	is	dated	5	
June	1898,	and	was	sent	from	Tampa.		Just	three	days	before	the	first	order	to	sail	was	
given	and	executed	General	Ludlow	was	in	possession	of	some	very	specific	data	that	
allowed	him	to	give	such	an	accurate	picture	of	what	was	going	on	in	Cuba.34		The	
problem	was	not	enough	or	accurate	information	but	how	to	put	it	to	use	during	the	
campaign.		That	is	the	crux	of	the	problem	for	Major	General	William	Shafter	and	
his	staff.		It	would	take	this	type	of	campaign	complete	with	all	the	errors	and	faults	
to	bring	about	the	most	important	change	in	the	Army,	the	creation	of	a	real	General	
Staff.
34	 	 Henry	 T.	 Corbin	 Papers:	 Library	 of	 Congress.	 Container	 No.	 1,	 Folder	 “Gen.	 Wm.	 Ludlow.”	
Manuscript	Division.	Washington,	D.C.		The	author	would	like	to	acknowledge	the	assistance	of	Gerard	
Casale	of	Bethesda,	Maryland	for	his	procuring	of	this	document.
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